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Abstract Evolutionary biology is striking for its ability to explain a large and diverse
range of empirical phenomena on the basis of a few general theoretical principles.
This article offers a philosophical perspective on the way that evolutionary biology
has come to achieve such impressive generality, by focusing on “the strategy of endo-
genization”. This strategy involves devising evolutionary explanations for biological
features that were originally part of the background conditions, or scaffolding, against
which such explanations take place. Where successful, the strategy moves biology
a step closer to the ideal of explaining as much as possible from evolutionary first
principles. The strategy of endogenization is illustrated through a series of biological
examples, historical and recent, and its philosophical implications are explored.
Keywords Evolutionary biology · Reductionism · First principles · Strategy of
endogenization
1 Introduction
One striking feature of evolutionary biology is its ability to explain a diverse range
of empirical phenomena on the basis of a few general theoretical principles. The
basic Darwinian argument, that natural selection acting on heritable variation will
lead organisms to evolve adaptations to their environment, turned out to be able to
explain quite a lot, as Darwin anticipated. The integration of Darwin’s principles with
Mendelian genetics in the early years of the twentieth century, and the ensuing “mod-
ern evolutionary synthesis”, further increased the explanatory power of evolutionary
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biology. Today opinions differ about whether the synthesis is still adequate, and about
which if any additional principles should be added to its toolkit.1 But whatever one’s
view on this, it seems clear that compared with most of the biosciences, which are
typically data-rich but theory-poor, evolutionary biology comes closer to the philoso-
pher’s ideal of subsuming many particular facts under as small a theoretical umbrella
as possible. In this respect, though not others, it is perhaps the branch of biology that
is most like physics.
My aim in this article is to offer a philosophical perspective on the historical
trajectory of evolutionary biology, by focusing on what I call the “strategy of endoge-
nization”. This refers to a particular way in which the generality of evolutionary theory
has been increased over time. It involves devising evolutionary explanations for bio-
logical features that were originally part of the background conditions, or scaffolding,
against which such explanations took place. Where successful, the features in ques-
tion cease to be part of the background and are brought within the fold of evolutionary
theory, or endogenized. One example is fair meiosis, or Mendelian segregation. Most
population-genetic models of evolution take for granted that each gene in a diploid
organism has a 50% chance of being transmitted to any gamete; this fact plays a
key role in the models’ workings, and it has important evolutionary consequences.
However as was eventually realized, there is a question as to why meiosis is usually
fair. When evolutionists tried to answer this question, they thereby endogenized fair
meiosis—it moved from background assumption to something that receives an evo-
lutionary explanation in its own right. Another example is hierarchical organization.
That biological entities form a nested hierarchy (gene, cell, organism, group, etc.) is
a presupposition of much evolutionary analysis. But in recent years there has been
a move to endogenize this hierarchy, by explaining how it evolved in the first place.
Many other examples are discussed below.
The strategy of endogenization is a useful concept for understanding how evolution-
ary biology has increased its explanatory power over time, for three reasons. Firstly, it
highlights a common methodological thread running through diverse scientific devel-
opments. Indeed a number of the “big themes” in recent evolutionary discussions,
such as evolvability, major transitions, and niche construction, involve an element of
endogenization. Secondly, the endogenization concept is relevant for philosophical
debates about how best to characterize the “essence” of evolution by natural selection.
The point here is that some candidates, e.g. the “replicator–interactor” framework,
while purporting to offer a fully general analysis of Darwinian evolution, in fact rely
on evolved features that, in a fuller analysis, should be endogenized. Thirdly, endo-
genization is directly relevant to the theme of this special issue: first principles in
science. For each time that a background feature is endogenized, this moves biology
a step closer towards the ideal of explaining as much as possible from evolutionary
first principles.
To appreciate this third point, note the pervasive tension within evolutionary biol-
ogy between the generality of the core Darwinian principles, which can be stated
abstractly, and the day-to-day applications of those principles, which are to biolog-
1 See the debate in Nature entitled “Does evolutionary theory need a re-think?” (Laland et al. 2014).
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ical systems with numerous contingent features, e.g. DNA-based storage of genetic
information, sexual reproduction, and germ-soma separation, to pick just three. The
tension is heightened because these features often function as enabling conditions,
explicit or implicit, in the specific explanations that biologists construct. By using the
strategy of endogenization, these features can sometimes be brought within the scope
of evolutionary explanation, thus reducing the number of primitives that evolutionary
biology has to assume. In this way, endogenization serves to implement a form of
reductionism, as the core Darwinian principles come to assume a larger and larger
explanatory burden.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the strategy of endo-
genization in more detail, distinguishing it from other ways in which the scope of
evolutionary theory has been increased. Section 3 explores six successful applications
of the endogenization strategy, to a range of biological phenomena. Section 4 con-
siders the limits of endogenization, while Sect. 5 relates endogenization to debates
about the “essence” of Darwinian evolution. Section 6 discusses first principles and
reductionism. Section 7 concludes.
2 What is the strategy of endogenization?
I borrow the term “endogenization” from economics, where a distinction is customar-
ily drawn between endogenous and exogenous variables in a theoretical model. The
former are ones whose values are determined by the model in question, while the
latter are treated as given. Thus for example, the aggregate demand for a commodity
depends on both the commodity’s price and on consumers’ income; but in the elemen-
tary model of supply and demand, price is an endogenous variable while income is
exogenous. This is because the model itself tells us what the equilibrium price will be,
but says nothing about what consumers’ income will be. Of course, there must be some
story about what determines income levels, but it lies outside the purview of the model
in question. Thus the endogenous/exogenous distinction is inherently model-relative.
In some cases it is possible to endogenize a variable that was previously treated as
exogenous, by devising a more general model.
I claim that in the historical development of evolutionary biology, we see a succes-
sive endogenization of variables that previous theorists had treated as exogenous. As
a result, the scope of evolutionary biology has been successively expanded, as evo-
lutionary explanations were devised for biological features that were previously part
of the unexplained background against which such explanations were constructed.
These features are diverse in character. They include: (i) aspects of genetics, e.g. fair
meiosis, dominance, linkage; (ii) aspects of the inheritance system, e.g. high-fidelity
replication, a single-celled bottleneck, non-inheritance of acquired characters; (iii)
aspects of reproduction, e.g. sex, recombination, gamete dimorphism; (iv) develop-
mental features, e.g. modularity, germ-line sequestration, the genotype–phenotype
map; (v) population-level features, e.g. genetic variation, dispersal, population subdi-
vision; (vi) large-scale features of biological systems, e.g. hierarchical organization.
The motivations for pursuing endogenization are various. In some cases it stems
from the realization that a particular feature is not universal, or exhibits previously
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unsuspected variation. For example, the discovery that rates of mutation and recom-
bination vary between genetic loci and between species prompted biologists to search
for adaptive explanations of these rates. Similarly, the discovery that sexual reproduc-
tion sometimes involves fusion of equal-sized gametes prompted biologists to wonder
why gamete dimorphism—the more usual arrangement—had evolved. In other cases,
though a given feature is known not to be universal, the drive to endogenize arises from
the realization that existing evolutionary biology tacitly makes assumptions which
limit its applicability to biological systems lacking the feature in question. Thus for
example, Buss (1988) makes a persuasive case that neo-Darwinian evolutionary the-
ory really only works well for non-clonal multi-celled organisms which sequester
their germ line in early ontogeny, attributes which many taxa lack. Buss’s argument
played a major role in prompting biologists to treat “individuality” as something to be
explained, rather than assumed.
Endogenization comes in two varieties, depending on the sort of evolutionary expla-
nation that the biological feature in question receives. In some cases the feature is
explained in terms of the fitness benefit that it confers on an individual organism (or
possibly, a whole group or species). Thus for example, Eshel’s famous explanation for
why meiosis is usually fair identifies a selective advantage that will accrue, in certain
circumstances, to an organism containing a modifier gene that restores fair Mendelian
segregation at other genetic loci at which it has broken down (Eshel 1985). In other
cases, the feature is explained as an unselected side-effect. Thus for example, one
explanation for why most species contain so much standing genetic variation is that
it is a side-effect of adaptation to a heterogeneous environment. So here, a biological
feature—within-species genetic variation—is accounted for in evolutionary terms, but
not because of any adaptive benefit that it itself brings.
To better understand what the strategy of endogenization involves, it helps to distin-
guish it from other ways in which evolutionary biology has increased its explanatory
scope over time. Firstly, endogenization is not merely the extension of evolutionary
theory to new classes of phenomena (though it may involve this). Examples of the
latter include the application of evolutionary principles to animal behaviour in the mid
twentieth century, which led to the field of behavioural ecology, and to the human
mind in the late twentieth century, which led to the field of evolutionary psychology.
Such extensions are of course important, but they do not count as examples of endog-
enization as I am using the term. For the phenomena in question were not exogenous
to begin with—they were not part of the background conditions against which other
evolutionary explanations had been constructed. Rather, they were things about which
previous evolutionary theory simply did not have much to say.
Secondly, endogenization isn’t just a matter of making more complicated or realistic
models. This occurred, for example, when evolutionary biologists incorporated envi-
ronmental stochasticity into their models, rather than treating the environment as fixed
as had been traditionally been done. This makes quite a big difference, demonstrating
that the assumption of environmental fixity was critical to many of the explanations
that evolutionary biology had devised.2 But the increase in generality that resulted
2 See Yoshimura and Clark (1993) ch.1 for a historical survey of the attempt to grapple with stochastic
environments.
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from incorporating environmental stochasticity was not a case of endogenization, for
it did not involve giving an evolutionary explanation of something that had previously
been taken for granted.
Finally, endogenization isn’t the same as filling in a black box. It is common in sci-
ence to black-box some questions in order to make progress with others. For example,
Darwin black-boxed heredity in The Origin—he invoked the fact of parent-offspring
resemblance without knowing how it came about. Similarly, the early neo-Darwinians
black-boxed ontogenetic development—they assumed that the genes in an embryo
affect the adult phenotype but without knowing how. In both cases, the black box was
filled in as science progressed, by advances in transmission genetics and developmen-
tal biology respectively. This is not endogenization, since although parent-offspring
resemblance and a systematic link between embryo genotype and adult phenotype
were (crucial) background assumptions in the explanations that Darwin and the neo-
Darwinians offered, the explanation of why these assumptions are valid was not itself
evolutionary, but mechanistic.
The strategy of endogenization can be illustrated by a comparison of J. B. S. Hal-
dane with R. A. Fisher, two of the major evolutionary theorists of the early twentieth
century. Haldane and Fisher both pursued the integration of Darwinian evolution with
Mendelian genetics, but in different ways.3 Haldane’s approach was to use the known
facts about Mendelian inheritance to construct models of the evolutionary process.
In a series of ten papers entitled “A mathematical theory of natural and artificial
selection”, Haldane explored the evolutionary consequences of a range of possible
assumptions concerning mating pattern, dominance/recessiveness, selection intensity
and more. However Fisher went one step further, offering evolutionary explanations
for the existence of dominance and linkage, rather than taking them as given. Fisher
(1932) described Haldane’s approach as “deductive” and his own as “inductive”. While
Haldane used known genetic facts as parameters in his evolutionary models, Fisher’s
view was that “genetics supplies the facts as to living things as they now are, facts
which …have an evolutionary history and may be capable of an evolutionary expla-
nation …facts which are not immutable laws of the workings of things but which
might have been different had evolutionary history taken a different course” (1932
p. 165). This is a neat expression of the philosophy behind the endogenization strat-
egy.
With there preliminaries in place, we are in a position to explore the strategy of
endogenization in more detail. How often does the strategy succeed? By what means
can the strategy be implemented? What are its logical limits? Does endogenization
teach us anything about the conceptual structure of evolutionary theory? Is a failure
to endogenize always a shortcoming, or can it be justified by the necessity of holding
some factors constant in order to study others? I probe these questions through a series
of biological examples.
3 This contrast between Haldane and Fisher is discussed by Edwards (2011), to whom I am indebted in
this paragraph.
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3 Endogenization: some success stories
3.1 The origin of variation
One important historical example of endogenization concerns the treatment of varia-
tion in evolutionary biology. Darwin himself emphasized that variation was an essential
ingredient of evolution by natural selection—if organisms do not vary, there is nothing
to select between. From his field observations, Darwin knew that abundant variability
was the norm in natural populations, but he did not understand where it came from,
nor why it was maintained. Indeed he famously worried that sexual mixing would
quickly render a population homogenous. This worry was defused with the advent
of Mendelism, which showed that sexual mixing has no inherent tendency to destroy
genetic variation, given the particulate nature of inheritance (i.e. the fact that genes
are inherited as discrete particles).4 But a deeper worry persisted, which is that natu-
ral selection itself will typically destroy variation. The selective preservation of some
variants and the elimination of others will reduce the total variance, genotypic and
phenotypic, in a population, other things being equal. So paradoxically, Darwinian
evolution eats up the very variation on which its continued operation depends. This
paradox is heightened by the fact that repeated rounds of selection are required to
produce the complex adaptations found in nature, as Darwin himself realized.
Given this situation, understanding the origins and maintenance of intra-specific
variation quickly became an urgent task for evolutionary biology. The urgency
increased in the 1960s and 70s with the discovery of extensive genetic polymorphisms
in natural populations, thanks to novel experimental techniques such as protein elec-
trophoresis. Today we understand that the ultimate source of new genetic variation is
mutation; while sex and recombination lead to the production of offspring with novel
combinations of genes. We have a detailed quantitative understanding of the effects
of mutation, sex and recombination on the genetic variation in a population; and some
understanding of how this genetic variation translates into phenotypic variation. Also,
we have a variety of candidate explanations for why natural selection may sometimes
preserve genetic variation rather than destroying it. These include overdominance (or
heterozygote superiority), frequency-dependent selection, spatial and temporal vari-
ability in selection coefficients, and the long-term advantage to a species of being able
to adapt quickly to environmental change. The net result is that between Darwin’s day
and today, variation has been endogenized: it has moved from being an unexplained
presupposition of evolutionary theory to something which receives an evolutionary
explanation in its own right.
This brief summary of how variation was endogenized does not do justice to the
intellectual effort involved. Understanding the evolutionary forces that affect mutation,
sex and recombination is a difficult task, that continues today. In a 1937 paper, the
geneticist A. H. Sturtevant asked why the mutation rate does not evolve to zero,
given that most mutations are harmful. He concluded that “no answer seems possible
4 This is shown by the Hardy–Weinberg equilibrium, which shows that in the absence of mutation and
selection, random mating will lead the frequency distribution of diploid genotypes to reach a stable equi-
librium.
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at present, other than the surmise that the nature of genes does not permit such a
reduction” (quoted in Sniegowski et al. 2000, p. 1064). Today we can say much more
than this. Thanks to a combination of theoretical and experimental work, we know
that the mutation rate can evolve, and does vary widely between taxa; that in certain
circumstances, modifier genes that raise the rate of mutation (at other loci) can be
selected; and that the mutation rate can typically be reduced, but only at a cost.
As regards sex and recombination, the situation is similar. Early attempts to explain
these phenomena included Weismann (1886), who suggested that sex is valuable
because it produces “individual differences” for natural selection to act on; and Fisher
(1930) and Muller (1932), who argued that recombination is advantageous because
it allows beneficial mutations that arise separately to be brought together in a single
individual, thus speeding up the rate of adaptation. These ideas are still taken seri-
ously today, but the field has moved on. There exist a variety of putative explanations
of the adaptive advantage of sex, including DNA repair, parasite resistance, and pro-
ducing offspring that are genetically heterogenous; and detailed mathematical models
exploring the costs and benefits of recombination in different circumstances.5 Despite
considerable empirical data, and experimental tests that attempt to separate the theo-
ries, no final consensus on why sex and recombination evolved has been reached. Thus
despite the great advances made since Darwin’s day, the endogenization of variability
represents unfinished business for evolutionary biology.
This example raises one important issue. Theories on the evolution of mutation,
sex and recombination fall into two camps. Some posit a short-term advantage to the
individual, while others posit a long-term advantage to the lineage or species. Thus
creating a store of genetic variability to buffer against environmental deterioration is a
long-term advantage of sex; while aiding DNA repair, or producing a genetically vari-
able offspring brood, is a short-term advantage. This distinction has sometimes been
obscured (in part because some early theorists discussed what are really individual-
level advantages in terms of their effect on population mean fitness), but it is crucial. In
general, positing individual-level advantage is preferable, given how natural selection
works. Positing a lineage-level advantage is only valid if the evolutionary mechanism
one has in mind is lineage-level selection, i.e. survival of some lineages and extinction
of others. This does occur, but it is less common than individual-level selection and
unlikely to explain the origin of complex adaptations (though may explain their main-
tenance.) This point is by now widely accepted, though it was not always so. Thus the
route that the endogenization took, in this case, involved an increasing shift in favour
of short-term explanations.
3.2 Males and females
A second example of the endogenization strategy concerns anisogamy, or gamete
dimorphism. This describes species like our own in which there are two sexes: females
who large produce gametes and males who produce small gametes. This has impor-
5 See Hartfield and Keightley (2012) for a fairly recent review of theories on the evolution of sex and
recombination.
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tant evolutionary consequences, since the optimal mating strategy for a male and a
female will typically differ, given that small gametes can be produced in much greater
number. Darwin himself realised this, in his pioneering discussion of “selection in
relation to sex”, and it lies at the heart of modern sexual selection theory. In effect, this
body of theory deals with the downstream evolutionary consequences of anisogamy
for male/female differences, both morphological and behavioural. But there is a fur-
ther question, which sexual selection theory does not answer, about why there exist
two different sexes in the first place. (Note that this is not the same as asking why
reproduction is sexual rather than asexual.) Though anisogamy is the rule in plants
and animals, it is not the ancestral state, and many microbial and fungal species that
reproduce sexually are isogamous (though often they have distinct mating types.)
Recognition of this fact led biologists to consider how anisogamy might have evolved
initially, that is, to endogenize it.
This problem was originally studied by Kalmus in the 1930s but came to fruition
in the 1960s and continues to be studied today. The well-known work of Parker et al.
(1972) provides one possible answer. They argued that there is a trade-off between the
number and size of gametes that an organism can produce, and that larger gametes are
generally fitter than smaller one, i.e. have a survival advantage. Given these assump-
tions, disruptive selection can quite easily lead, from an isogamous starting point, to
distinct male and female castes, with different specializations. In effect, males spe-
cialize in making lots of low-fitness gametes, while females specialize in making a
few high-fitness ones. On this theory, therefore, the inherent trade-off between gamete
size and number implies a direct selective advantage for anisogamy; thus potentially
explaining the existence of males and females.
This theory enjoys empirical support but does not fit all the known facts, so a num-
ber of rival explanations have been developed too.6 One is that anisogamy evolved in
order to prevent intra-genomic conflict. Anisogamy ensures that all of the cytoplasmic
elements in a fertilized zygote, such as mitochondria, derive from the mother—the
male contributes only nuclear genes. This may well be advantageous, since if cyto-
plasmic elements derived from both parents, then conflict between these elements
would be inevitable, as they would be genetically diverse, so would each promote its
own interests at the expense of the organism. Anisogamy is thus the organism’s way
of preempting such internal conflict, according to this explanation.
As in the case of sex and recombination, debate over the merits of the rival the-
ories continues, so understanding the evolution of anisogamy is a work-in-progress.
But the point to note is how, as evolutionary biology progressed, a biological fea-
ture went from being a presupposition of other evolutionary explanations, indeed
the premise on which the whole field of sexual selection theory was built, to being
something of which an evolutionary explanation was itself sought. This is a paradigm
illustration of how endogenization can deepen the explanatory reach of evolutionary
theory.
6 See Billiard et al. (2010) for a useful survey of the alternative theories.
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3.3 Altruism and population structure
A third example of endogenization comes from social evolution theory. As is well-
known, a major preoccupation in this field is altruistic or pro-social behaviour, that is,
behaviour which reduces an organism’s fitness but enhances that of others. Altruism
is prima facie puzzling, as Darwin himself saw, since an organism which behaves
altruistically will apparently be at a selective disadvantage. The basic solution to
this puzzle is that for altruism to evolve by natural selection, the beneficiaries of the
altruistic actions must have a statistical tendency to be altruists themselves. Thus non-
random assortment is needed, i.e. altruists must tend to associate with each other.
Such assortment can arise because of kinship, or because of population sub-division,
or both. If organisms tend to interact with their kin, or with other members of their
social group, this can generate the statistical association between altruist and recipient
that is the precondition for altruism to evolve. Precursors of this idea can be found in
Darwin (1879), Fisher (1930) and Haldane (1932), but it was first spelled out clearly
by Hamilton (1964); it lies at the heart of the explanations for the evolution of altruism
given by the modern theories of kin and multi-level selection.
In retrospect, we can see an interesting trend in social evolution theory over the last
40 years. Early treatments tended simply to posit the population structure, or pattern of
assortative interaction, necessary for altruism to evolve. Thus in Hamilton’s original
theoretical work, it is simply assumed that social behaviour occurs between relatives;
his “coefficient of relatedness”, denoted r , which measures how closely altruist and
recipient are related, is exogenous in his theoretical models. Something similar is true
of early work in the group selection tradition, which simply starts from the assumption
that populations are sub-divided into groups, such as colonies or demes, which are
genetically different. This is not necessarily a problem, and could be justified on
empirical grounds, particularly given that altruism does indeed appear to have evolved.
But there is a deeper question about how the necessary population structure came into
being in the first place. Social evolution theorists came to realize this, and thus tried
to endgonenize these features by constructing more complicated models.
A recent paper by Powers et al. (2011) illustrates this point nicely. They argue that
many extant explanations of cooperation (or altruism) are incomplete, as they fail to
account for the origin of the population structures that they invoke as premises in their
explanation. To redress this, the authors construct a model in which cooperation and
population structure co-evolve, and show that this makes a substantial difference to the
ease with which cooperation can evolve. In a similar vein, other social evolutionists
have devised models in which dispersal co-evolves with altruism; the point here is that
how far an organism disperses from its parents determines how likely it is to interact
with relatives, and thus whether the resulting population structure will be conducive
to the evolution of altruistic behaviour or not.
This endogenizing trend is also reflected in how the coefficient of relatedness r
has come to be treated in social evolution theory. Though Hamilton originally defined
r in genealogical terms, as the probability that donor and recipient share genes that
are “identical by descent”, what really matters is statistical association between social
partners, whether due to kinship or not (as Hamilton himself noted in a later 1975
paper). Modern treatments thus typically define r directly as a measure of statistical
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association. This shift in the meaning of r is well-known, but it has one implication that
is less well-known, namely that the value of r may change as the population evolves.
Thus in a full evolutionary analysis, r needs to be treated as a dynamic variable, not a
fixed parameter, which is how precisely how some recent models of social evolution
treat the relatedness coefficient.7
In this example, the motivation to endogenize is somewhat different from in other
examples. It reflects a realization that early explanations for the evolution of altruism
were “too easy”, in that they had unwittingly helped themselves to something that was
equally in need of explanation as altruism itself, namely the population structures that
permit it to flourish. Thus it is not an abstract commitment to reductionism, nor to
extending the scope of evolutionary theory, that drives the endogenization in this case,
but rather the need to explain the evolution of altruism without begging the question.
3.4 Niche construction
A fourth example of endogenization concerns niche construction, currently a hot topic
in evolutionary biology. This refers to the fact that organisms’ activities often modify
the environment, of both their own and other species. The origins of this concept lie in
Lewontin’s observation that in principle, there are two ways in which an adaptive fit
between organism and environment can come about (Lewontin 1983). The organism
can evolve adaptations to the environment via natural selection, or it can modify the
environment within its own lifetime to suits its needs, as for example when a beaver
builds a dam. Lewontin argued that traditional neo-Darwinism recognized only the
first of these routes to achieving organism-environment fit, neglecting the second. This
reflected a broader tendency in evolutionary biology to treat “the environment” as a
given rather than as something that can itself undergo evolutionary modification.
Though in a sense the point that Lewontin was making is obvious—biologists have
never denied that beavers build dams, after all—it is true that a lot is often packed into
“the environment” in evolutionary explanations, and rather little said about how the
environment came to be the way it is. This might be justified on pragmatic grounds:
one cannot explain everything at once. However, in their influential book on niche
construction, Odling-Smee et al. (2003) argue persuasively that organism-induced
modifications of the environment cannot safely be ignored in evolutionary biology,
even as a pragmatic expedient. They construct theoretical models to show that such
modifications can generate novel evolutionary dynamics. Their flagship model is based
on two-locus population genetics. One locus, with alleles E and e, affects an organismic
behaviour which itself alters the level of a critical resource R in the environment. The
second locus, with alleles A and a, has an effect on organismic viability that depends
on the amount of R. Thus as niche-constructing behaviour evolves at the first locus,
the environment is modified, and this in turn alters selection pressures at the second
locus. Odling-Smee et al. adduce empirical evidence, from diverse taxa, for thinking
that niche construction of this sort actually occurs. And they argue that in our own
7 See van Baalen and Rand (1998) for an example of such a model.
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species, cultural niche construction can dramatically alter the rate and direction of
human evolution.
Though the empirical significance of niche construction, and the extent to which
the concept marks a break with traditional neo-Darwinism, are both matters of dispute,
the basic logic of Odling-Smee et al.’s argument is surely correct. I suggest that their
work be understood as a particular application of the strategy of endogenization,
where the feature being endgoenized is the selective environment itself. In effect,
Lewontin’s critique was that classical evolutionary models treat the environment as
exogenous when really it should be endogenized. Niche construction theory addresses
Lewontin’s point by describing how the environment co-evolves with the organisms
in it. This relaxes an idealization that is implicit in many classical models, and thus
increases the generality of evolutionary theory.
In Sect. 2, we argued that endogenization can be of two different sorts, depending
on whether the feature in question is explained as an adaptation or a side-effect.
Interestingly, Odling-Smee et al.’s concept of niche construction covers both of these
cases. They define the concept broadly, to include any organism-induced modification
of the environment at all, whether of their own niche or of others. Thus beavers’
building dams and spiders’ spinning webs count as niche construction, but so too do
micro-organisms causing oxygen to accrue in the atmosphere over millennia.8 In the
former examples, the organism-induced modifications are beneficial for the organisms
in question, or their offspring; while in the latter, they are side-effects, positive or
negative, on the selective environment encountered by other species, possibly at a
much later date. Thus niche construction involves endogenization of both sorts.
3.5 Hierarchical organization
A fifth example concerns hierarchical organization. It is a familiar observation that
the entities biologists study are hierarchically arranged. How exactly “the” biological
hierarchy should be characterized (and whether there is only one), is not entirely obvi-
ous, but a typical account goes something like “gene–chromosome–cell–multicelled
organism–colony–population–species”, where adjacent entities stand in a part-whole
relation. The existence of hierarchical organization is not of course a recent discovery,
nor one that evolutionary biology has ignored. Indeed, it lies at the heart of the “levels-
of-selection” question in biology, which goes right back to Darwin. That question is
about the level(s) of the hierarchy at which the process of natural selection occurs, and
at which adaptations are found. However there has been a subtle shift in the way that
hierarchical organization is conceptualized, in discussions of the levels-of-selection,
which relates directly to the strategy of endogenization.
To see this, consider the way that the levels-of-selection question is traditionally
set up, for example by Lewontin (1970). Firstly, it is noted that evolution by natural
selection will operate on any entities satisfying three conditions: variability, resulting
fitness differences, and heritability (or parent-offspring resemblance). Secondly, it is
8 Okasha (2005a) argues that that these two sorts of examples should not be lumped together under a single
label (niche-construction), since their evolutionary logic is quite different.
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noted that these conditions can be satisfied by entities at more than one hierarchical
level, e.g. genes, organisms or groups; so in principle, selection and adaptation can
occur at multiple levels. That is, it is the joint facts of hierarchical organization, plus
the abstractness of the conditions required for Darwinian evolution, that generate the
levels-of-selection question, on this view.
The problem with setting the issue up this way, as Griesemer (2000) insightfully
notes, is that it takes the existence of the biological hierarchy for granted, as if hierar-
chical organization were simply an exogenously given fact about the organic world.
But of course the biological hierarchy is itself the product of evolution, not something
that was there at the dawn of life. Even cells, entities fairly low down the hierarchy as
usually described, are highly complex, evolved entities; and eukaryotic cells, we now
know, were originally formed by the merger of two prokaryotic cell lineages. Now
presumably, there is an evolutionary story to be told about how this came about; and
similarly for entities at other hierarchical levels, e.g. multi-celled organisms. So ide-
ally, we would like an evolutionary theory that explains how the biological hierarchy
came into existence, rather than taking it for granted.
Over the last twenty-five years or so, evolutionary biology has risen to this chal-
lenge. The burgeoning literature on “major transitions in evolution”, also known as
“evolutionary transitions in individuality”, is in large part an attempt to grapple with
the origins of hierarchical organization.9 As characterized by Maynard Smith and Sza-
thmáry (1995), such transitions occur when a number of free-living entities, originally
capable of surviving and reproducing alone, become aggregated into a higher-level
unit, giving rise to a new hierarchical level; eventually, the lower-level entities lose the
ability to survive and reproduce alone, and become parts of a whole. Examples include
the transition from solitary replicators to networks of replicators enclosed in compart-
ments, from independent genes to chromosomes, from unicellular to multicellular
organisms, and from solitary organisms to colonies. The challenge is to understand
these transitions in Darwinian terms. Why was it advantageous for the lower-level
entities to sacrifice their individuality, cooperate with one another, and form a larger
corporate body? And how could such an arrangement, once it arose, be evolutionarily
stable?
The traditional levels-of-selection question reappears in the context of the evolution-
ary transitions, but in a subtly transformed way (cf. Okasha 2005b). In the traditional
setting, the levels question was “synchronic”: it was about selection and adaptation
at pre-existing hierarchical levels. In the evolutionary transitions literature, the levels
question becomes “diachronic”: it is about the evolution of the hierarchy in the first
place. One way to understand this change is to think of it as an application of the
strategy of endogenization, where the feature that is being endogenized is hierarchical
organization itself. Traditionally evolutionary biology treated this feature as exoge-
nous, part of the background against which other explanations were constructed; but
as the science progressed, and the evolutionary transitions discussion took off, the
feature came to receive an evolutionary explanation of its own. This perspective, I
9 Key early works in this tradition include Buss (1988), Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (1995) and Michod
(1999). For more recent discussion, see Sterelny and Calcott (2011), Bourke (2011), and Szathmáry (2015).
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suggest, helps us to understand the (much-disputed) relationship between the older
and the newer discussions of the levels-of-selection question.
This example has two interesting features. Firstly, it points to one way that the
endogenization strategy can be implemented, namely by re-deploying theoretical tools
originally designed for a different purpose. Biologists were readily able to understand
the evolutionary transitions in Darwinian terms, because the principles of social evo-
lution theory, which were originally designed to explain social behaviour in animals,
turned out to have much broader applicability. The major themes of social evolution
theory–cooperation, conflict, relatedness, division-of-labour–are relevant to each of
the transitions, and thus provided a ready theoretical framework with which to endo-
genize hierarchical organization.
Secondly, this example shows how a lack of endogenization can sometimes be a
source of scientific error. In the earlier discussions, in which the biological hierarchy
was taken as given, many biologists were inclined to dismiss the levels-of-selection
debate as a storm in teacup–arguing that in practice, selection on individual organisms
is the most important factor in evolution, whatever about other theoretical possibil-
ities.10 But as Michod (1999) stresses, multicellular organisms did not come from
nowhere; they evolved from aggregations of single cells, so in a sense are just highly
cooperative cell groups. Thus levels of selection other than that of “the individual
organism” must have existed in the past, whether or not they still operate today. Once
the hierarchy is endogenized, the argument that individual selection “is all that matters
in practice” is seen to be unsustainable.
3.6 The genotype–phenotype map
Our sixth example concerns the genotype–phenotype (G–P) map, that is, the way in
which changes in an organism’s genotype are translated into changes in its phenotype.
The importance of this map for Darwinian evolution has long been recognized. Thus
in an influential paper, Lewontin (1978) argued that in order for organisms to evolve
adaptations by cumulative natural selection, a condition called “quasi-independence”
must be met. This means that it is possible to modify one organismic trait without too
much of an effect on its other traits; in other words, pleiotropic effects should not be
too pervasive.11 Were this not so, natural selection would not be able to gradually hone
a trait for a particular function, for the probability of the necessary adaptive variants
arising by mutation would simply be too low. Since many organisms have evolved a
close adaptive fit to the environment, along multiple trait dimensions, this suggests
that the G–P map of many species does in fact satisfy quasi-independence, at least
approximately.
Lewontin’s argument is insightful, and makes a point that is surely correct. However
with the wisdom of hindsight there is something unsatisfactory about his discussion.
For while he argues persuasively that quasi-independence is a hidden presupposition
10 Thus for example C. H. Waddington described the original levels-of-selection debate as “a rather foolish
controversy” (quoted in Maynard Smith 1976 p. 277).
11 Pleiotropy means that a given gene affects more than one phenotypic trait.
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of Darwinian explanations, he does not consider why the presupposition holds good.
That is, Lewontin’s analysis tells us what the G–P map must be like in order that
natural selection be capable of producing complex adaptations, but does not address
the question of how the map got to be like that in the first place. Is it simply a lucky
accident, or did it itself evolve from an ancestral state in which it was different?
Lewontin does not tell us. Ideally, we would like our evolutionary theory to endogenize
the G–P map, rather than to treat it as a given.
Again, recent evolutionary biology has risen to this challenge, in the literature
on the evolution of evolvability.12 Evolvability refers to the capacity of a lineage to
undergo sustained adaptive change over time. In a pioneering discussion, Wagner and
Altenberg (1996) identified a number of conditions on the G–P map that are necessary
for evolvability, which incorporate but go beyond Lewontin’s quasi-independence.
They include: that mutations generate a continual supply of adaptive variants; that
multiple simultaneous mutations are not needed to improve a trait; and that traits can
be modified independently of each other. In general, these conditions are facilitated
by an organism’s genetic architecture being modular. This means that many genes
within the genome have phenotypic effects that are confined to a limited number of
developmental pathways, or modules, so do not affect the whole organism’s phenotype
at once.
Wagner and Altenberg stress, surely correctly, that evolvability is not inevitable:
it is easy to conceive of genetic architectures, or G–P maps, that would frustrate the
capacity of a lineage to undergo sustained evolutionary change. More controversially,
they suggest that evolvability should be thought of as itself an adaptation, on the
grounds that the G–P map “is under genetic control” (p. 969). They adduce evidence
for thinking that mutations at one genetic locus can affect the way in which genotypic
variation maps onto phenotypic variation at other loci, e.g. by increasing the degree of
developmental canalization, that is, buffering the organism’s phenotype against genetic
and environmental perturbations. If Wagner and Altenberg are right, this suggests that
the G–P map can be endogenized in the first way, i.e. that it admits of an adaptive
explanation in its own right.
An alternative view is that evolvability, and/or the G–P map that underlies it, should
be thought of as a byproduct rather than a direct target of selection, i.e. that it can only
be endogenized the second way (Piglucci 2008). This view may seem preferable given
the widely-agreed point that natural selection cannot anticipate the future. Surely the
capacity of a lineage to undergo future evolution is not the sort of thing that can be
directly selected for in the present? Though this is correct, note that selection at the
lineage level is a possibility, at the time-scales relevant for the evolution of the G–P
map. That is, maybe lineages whose G–P maps did not lead them to be sufficiently
evolvable went extinct, as they were unable to adapt when the environment changed,
leaving behind only lineages with G–P maps which facilitate evolvability?
The underlying issue here—side-effect versus individual-level benefit versus
lineage-level benefit—is a matter of ongoing debate in the literature on the evolu-
tion of evolvability; here is not the place to attempt a resolution. Whichever of these
12 See for example Wagner and Altenberg (1996), Hansen (2006), and Pigliucci (2008).
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views turns out to be correct, the point to note, again, is how a biological feature
went from being an implicit presupposition of most other evolutionary explanations
to receiving one of its own.
4 The limits of endogenization
The foregoing examples show that the strategy of endogenization is fairly pervasive
in evolutionary biology; it is a thread that runs through a number of important devel-
opments in the field. This raises an immediate question. How far can the strategy be
pushed? Are there cases where it cannot be applied?
One limit arises because not all biological features have an evolutionary explanation
(whether as adaptations or side-effects). For they may be inevitable consequences
of other scientific laws, so never have been different in the first place. In certain
cases, such features may nonetheless be an important part of the background against
which evolutionary explanations are constructed. To illustrate, consider life-history
theory, the branch of evolutionary biology which studies how organisms apportion
their reproductive effort over their lifetime. Models in life-history theory invariably
assume a negative trade-off between survival and reproduction—the better an organism
is at one, the less good it will be at the other.13 This trade-off is fundamental to how
the models work, so certainly counts as a background assumption that has shaped
other evolutionary explanations; indeed if survival and reproduction did not exhibit a
trade-off, the consequences for life-history evolution would be quite dramatic. But it
would not be possible to apply the endogenization strategy here. The existence of this
trade-off is not an evolved feature of modern organisms; rather its universality reflects
a physical constraint, namely that organisms cannot expend energy on reproduction
and on trying to survive at the same time.
Though this is true, it is debatable how much of a limit to the endogenization strategy
it really represents. For even in this example, the particular shape of the survival–
reproduction trade-off, e.g. whether it is convex or concave, is something that can
and does evolve; and this shape plays a crucial role in the predictions of life-history
theory. (A convex trade-off favours iteroparity, i.e. many repoductive episodes in an
organism’s lifetime, while a concave trade-off favours semelparity, i.e. reproducing
just once.) Now the convexity or concavity of the survival–reproduction trade-off
depends on the mortality and fertility schedule of the species in question, and these
features do of course respond to natural selection, hence can change over time. So in
short, although the existence of the trade-off is not a candidate for endogenization, its
precise nature, or form, certainly is.
More generally, the importance or otherwise of structural constraints, that derive
from physical or biophysical laws, in constraining the organic forms that can evolve is
an old debate in evolutionary biology, that has re-surfaced repeatedly; here is not the
place to attempt a resolution.14 Certainly if such constraints are pervasive, it follows
13 See Stearns (1992) for an introduction to life-history theory.
14 See Hansen (2015) for a good survey of the role of constraints in evolution, including discussion of the
“structuralist” opposition to neo-Darwinism.
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that the set of biological features that do not admit of evolutionary explanation, because
they could not have been otherwise (in some fairly robust sense of “could”) will be quite
large. However even so, the endogenization strategy will often play an indirect role in
helping us to understand constrained features. For distinguishing such features from
universal features of modern organisms that owe their universality not to constraints but
to stabilizing selection, and thus do admit of an evolutionary explanation, is not easy.
(The genetic code is a possible example of the latter: alternative codes are not prohibited
by the laws of nature, but stabilizing selection has worked against them.) Indeed it
may only be possible to draw this distinction by trying and failing to construct an
evolutionary explanation for a given feature; in which case the attempt to endogenize,
even if unsuccessful, will play an important role.
A quite different sort of limit arises simply because evolution by natural selection
must have begun somewhere. As work on chemical or pre-biotic evolution has taught
us, a type of Darwinian process was likely at work on earth long before anything
distinctively biological had arisen, involving simple molecules with the ability to
self-replicate. Given this ability, the conditions necessary for a Darwinian process
to occur—variation, differences in replication rate, and heritability—were satisfied,
so an evolutionary process could get underway, eventually giving rise to something
like modern RNA. Inevitably our knowledge of how this happened is partial, but it is
clear that the very first self-replicating molecules must have arisen by non-Darwinian
means. For this to happen, the necessary chemical building blocks must have been
present in the primeval soup; their presence thus represents a feature that, as a matter
of logic, could not be endogenized by evolutionary theory.
This point is clearly correct, however its practical import is fairly small. For although
abiogenesis and pre-biotic evolution are important topics, relatively little is known
about them, and they are not at the forefront of modern evolutionary research. That
Darwinian evolution must have had a beginning is perfectly true, and represents a
logical limit on the endogenization strategy; however this is quite compatible with the
main thesis of this essay, namely that the strategy represents one important way in
which evolutionary theory has successively expanded its explanatory reach over time.
5 The “core” of Darwinian evolution
The strategy of endogenization is made possible by the fact that the core Darwinian
principles are abstract in nature, so potentially applicable very widely. This is what
permits diverse biological features, including ones that were originally part of the
unexplained background, to be subsumed under the evolutionary umbrella. However
a minor irony in fact lurks here. For although the abstractness of the core Darwinian
principles is a widely acknowledged point, there is a lack of agreement on how exactly
these principles should be formulated. Moreover, some candidate formulations appeal
to biological features which are in fact the products of evolution, and so in a fully
general analysis should themselves be endogenized. Ironically, then, what makes the
strategy of endogenization possible is the fact that the core Darwinian principles are
abstract; and yet those very principles are often formulated in a way that fails the test
of endogenization.
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To illustrate, consider the famous “replicator–interactor” conceptualization of evo-
lution by natural selection, due to Dawkins (1982) and Hull (1980). According to
these authors, Darwinian evolution involves repeated rounds of replication followed
by environmental interaction, so involves entities of two different sorts: replicators
and interactors.15 Replicators are defined as entities of which copies are made, and
which “pass on their structure intact” from one generation to the next; they are charac-
terized by the attributes of “longevity” and “copying fidelity”. Interactors are defined
as entities that “interact as cohesive wholes with their environment”, in a way that
causes replication to be differential. Both Dawkins and Hull intend this to be a fully
general analysis of Darwinian evolution, in principle applicable to biological systems
of various sorts, and perhaps also to non-biological (e.g. cultural) evolution. However,
there is a mismatch between the desired generality and the way that their key terms
are defined.
The point is a simple one. The longevity and copying fidelity of replicators (such
as genes), and the cohesiveness of interactors (such as organisms) are highly evolved
properties, themselves the product of many rounds of cumulative natural selection.16
The very first replicators must have had extremely poor copying fidelity, and lacked
longevity; indeed a major challenge in pre-biotic evolution is to understand how in
the absence of error correcting enzymes, replicating molecules more than a few base
pairs long could have persisted, given the mutation rate. (This is known as the Eigen
paradox.17) Similarly, the earliest multicellular organisms must have been highly non-
cohesive entities, owing to competition between their constituent cell lineages (Buss
1988; Michod 1999). As we know from recent work on intra-organsmic conflict, the
cohesion and unity of modern organisms, to the extent that it exists, is an evolutionary
achievement, not the ancestral condition, and it is constantly in danger of breaking
down. This points to a limitation of the Dawkins/Hull framework. For if we wish to
understand how copying fidelity and cohesiveness evolved in the first place, we cannot
build these requirements into the very concepts used to formulate the Darwinian theory.
What exactly does this show? One moral is as follows. In so far as the aim is to for-
mulate the Darwinian principles in a way that is maximally general, the Dawkins/Hull
formulation is inferior to certain alternative formulations that have been proposed in
the literature.18 These include: the widely-used “heritable variation in fitness” analysis
of Lewontin (1970); the closely related analysis of Maynard Smith (1988) according
to which “multplication, variation and heredity” are the key ingredients; the “Price
equation” approach of Price et al. (1970), which says that trait-fitness covariance is
key; and the formulation due to Griesemer (2000), in which the key notion is that of
a “reproducer”, rather than a replicator. Though these formulations differ somewhat
in purpose, they all purport to identify the essence, or conceptual core, of Darwinian
evolution. But unlike the Dawkins/Hull formulation, then do so without relying, at
15 Dawkins uses the term “vehicle” in place of Hull’s “interactor”; the meaning is essentially the same.
16 This point is emphasized by Griesemer (2000).
17 The paradox is named after Eigen (1971). See Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (1995) for a good discus-
sion.
18 This point has been argued for on independent grounds by Okasha (2006) chapter 1, and Godfrey-Smith
(2009).
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least overtly, on any evolved features of modern organisms, thus passing the test of
endogenization.
Now it might be argued that this is unfair to Dawkins and Hull, on the grounds that
their framework does not aim to capture every conceivable case of evolution by natural
selection, but rather to characterize the particular sort of evolution that is capable of
leading to adaptive complexity. Conceivably it may be true that without high-fidelity
replicators and cohesive interactors, the Darwinian process would never have been
able to produce the “interesting” organismic adaptations that we find in nature; in
which case treating these features as essential conditions for Darwinian evolution
would make a certain amount of sense, despite the features themselves having an
evolutionary history. In short, the lack of endogenization is certainly a problem if the
aim is to devise a scheme that captures all possible instances of Darwinian evolution;
but it is less of a problem if the aim is to capture the subset capable of producing
interesting adaptations.
Whether something like this is true to Dawkins’ and Hull’s original intentions, and
those of other “replicator-first” theorists, is not a question that can be addressed here.
However it raises a more general issue, of how much in evolutionary biology can be
explained in terms of the core Darwinian principles themselves—however exactly they
are formulated—as opposed to those principles taken in conjunction with additional
biological features. I look briefly at this issue next.
6 On reduction to first principles
Let us return to the theme of this special issue: first principles in science. The prevalence
of the endogenization strategy in evolutionary biology, and its numerous successes,
may seem to support a strong form of reductionism, according to which all or almost
all biological features can be explained on the basis of fundamental evolutionary prin-
ciples. For each successful endogenization means that features that were originally
part of the unexplained background are brought under the evolutionary umbrella, thus
extending the the explanatory scope of the core Darwinian principles. So endoge-
nization may seem to fit with the reductionist vision championed by Dennett (1995),
who describes evolution by natural selection as a “universal acid” that cuts through
everything in its path.
Though tempting, this conclusion does not necessarily follow. For there is a less
reductionist alternative, that is also compatible with the prevalence and success of the
endogenization strategy. The alternative is this. It is not the core Darwinian princi-
ples themselves that bear the explanatory burden in evolutionary biology, but rather
those principles as they operate in specific biological settings, in the presence of
additional contingent biological features. There are many candidates for what these
additional features are, some of which we have discussed already. They include: high-
fidelity replication (Dawkins 1976); digital information storage (Maynard Smith and
Szathmáry 1995); particulate rather than blending inheritance (Fisher 1930); quasi-
independence (Lewontin 1978); and gene regulation by allosteric proteins (Monod
1971). Each of these features has been argued to be essential, for Darwinian evolution
to have produced the particular phenomena, such as adaptive complexity, that we find
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in the biosphere. Thus for example, Fisher argues that without particulate inheritance,
evolution would quickly grind to a halt unless the mutation rate were improbably
high; Maynard Smith and Szathmáry argue that without digital information storage,
the number of possible life forms would be too small to permit anything very inter-
esting to evolve; while Dawkins and Lewontin argue that high-fidelity replication
and quasi-independence, respectively, are pre-requisites for the evolution of complex
adaptations.
Now as we have stressed, many if not all of these features have themselves evolved,
or at least depend on biological structures that have evolved. Thus they are candidates
for endogenization. But the key point is this. Suppose we grant that one of these features
is essential to explaining adaptive complexity, as the above authors argue. Suppose it
then turns out that the feature in question can be given an evolutionary explanation of its
own, or endogenized. This may seem to invite the reductionist conclusion that in fact,
adaptive complexity can be explained in terms of the core Darwinian principles alone,
contrary to our first supposition. But in fact this does not follow. That an evolutionary
explanation of some phenomenon invokes a given background feature; and that that
feature can itself be given (some other) evolutionary explanation, does not imply that
the initial phenomenon can be explained in terms of evolutionary principles alone,
without appeal to the background feature.
This point reflects a sort of “non-monotonicity” of explanation. If theory T , in
conjunction with background condition Y , explains phenomenon X ; and if theory
T can itself explain why condition Y holds; it does not follow that T alone can
explain X . (Let T be the theory of evolution by natural selection, X the existence of
adaptive complexity, and Y a feature such as high-fidelity replication.) Obviously this
would follow if we replaced “explains” with “entails” (or “logically implies”); but
philosophers of science know well that entailment is neither necessary nor sufficient
for scientific explanation. If instead we identify explaining something with raising its
probability,19 then the failure of the above principle is immediate, for the conditions (I)
P(X |T &Y ) > P(X) and (II) P(Y |T ) > P(Y ) do not jointly imply (III) P(X |T ) >
P(X).
To help see why this is, note that (I) is equivalent to P(X&T &Y )/P(T &Y ) >
P(X). Now let us suppose, as will be plausible in certain cases, that P(Y |X&T ) = 1,
that is, the probability of background condition Y obtaining, conditional on the truth
of theory T and the occurrence of phenomenon X , is 1; which is equivalent to
P(X&T &Y ) = P(X&T ). Substituting into (I), this gives P(X&T )/P(T &Y ) >
P(X). Now this is compatible with the falsity of (III), so long as P(T &Y ) is suffi-
ciently smaller than P(T ) (since (III) is equivalent to P(X&T )/P(T ) > P(X)). And
P(T &Y )  P(T ) is compatible with condition (II), so long as P(Y ) is sufficiently
small. More generally, whenever we have P(Y |X&T ) ≈ 1 and P(T &Y )  P(T ),
then so long as P(Y ) is sufficiently small, conditions (I) and (II) will be true but (III)
will be false.
19 The idea that enhancement of prior probability, aka “positive relevance”, rather than entailment, is the key
to the concept of scientific explanation is a theme in Salmon’s critique of Hempel’s theory on explanation.
See for example Salmon (1989).
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This is all rather abstract, but our illustrative example may in fact constitute a
case in point. Suppose that the prior probability of organisms exhibiting high-fidelity
replication (Y ) is very low; this seems reasonable, given that most conceivable replica-
tion systems are not high-fidelity. Suppose further that the probability of high-fidelity
replication, conditional on the truth of the theory of evolution (T ) and the existence
of adaptive complexity (X ), is extremely high; this is also plausible, if Dawkins is
right that evolution could only have produced adaptive complexity in the presence of
high-fidelity replication. Suppose finally that the prior probability that the theory of
evolution is true is substantially greater than the probability that the theory is true
and that high-fidelity replication exists (T &Y ); this too is plausible, since by assump-
tion high-fidelity replication is improbable, and the theory of evolution itself, sans
the existence of adaptive complexity, arguably does not make it probable in absolute
terms (though it does increase its probability). If all of this is right, then we have that
P(Y ) is very low, P(Y |X&T ) ≈ 1 and P(T &Y )  P(T ); so by the argument of
the last paragraph, conditions (I) and (II) are true but (III) is not. If we are happy
to equate “explains” with “raises the prior probability of”, this means that the theory
of evolution and the assumption of high-fidelity replication together explain adaptive
complexity, the theory of evolution itself explains high-fidelity replication, but the
theory of evolution alone does not explain adaptive complexity.
(Note that in practice, when evolutionary theory endogenizes some background
feature Y , it will probably make use of further background assumptions Z , i.e. it is
not T alone but rather T &Z that will explain Y ; which then raises the question of
whether Z can itself can be endogenized, and so-on. (What explains the evolution of
high-fidelity replication is not the core Darwinian principles alone, but those principles
plus further biological assumptions.) But the point of the foregoing paragraph is that
even if this process eventually bottoms out, and a given background feature is explained
by T alone, it still does not follow that T alone can explain all the phenomena that T
plus that background feature can explain, so long as “explains” is understood in a way
that does not imply “entails”.)
This analysis can illuminate one strand in the current debate over niche construc-
tion.20 Proponents of niche construction argue that it is an “evolutionary process in its
own right”, by which they mean that it plays an essential role in evolutionary expla-
nation. One of the central explananda of evolutionary biology–the striking “fit” of
organism to environment–cannot be explained by natural selection alone, they claim;
niche construction is essential too. Opponents respond that organisms’ ability to suc-
cessfully niche-construct is itself an evolved attribute, and thus in principle must admit
of an explanation in selective terms, i.e. natural selection has led organisms to acquire
the ability to modify their niches. Reconstructed this way, the debate can be seen to
instantiate the above pattern. The proponents argue that to explain a particular phe-
nomenon, traditional Darwinian evolution is not enough—an additional explanatory
factor is needed too; the opponents respond that since that background factor is itself
evolved, then at root, Darwinian evolution can do all the explanatory work, so no fun-
damental modification of the theory is needed. Our analysis suggests that, in principle,
20 See the for-and-against arguments in Scott-Phillips et al. (2014). Thanks to an anonymous referee for
suggesting this example.
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either camp in this debate may be right. Nothing in the logic of scientific explanation
shows that the opponents’ reductionist story is compulsory, but nothing precludes it
either.
The upshot, therefore, is that recognizing the prevalence of the strategy of endo-
genization in evolutionary biology does not automatically push us to a Dennett-style
“universal acid” position, in which everything is explained by the core Darwinian
principles themselves (i.e. variation, fitness differences, and heredity). It is equally
compatible with an alternative, milder form of reductionism, according to which it is
not the core Darwinian principles alone, but rather those principles in conjunction with
additional contingent biological features, that do the explanatory work. That these
additional features have themselves evolved, so are candidates for endogenization,
does not force us to the extreme reductionist alternative, though it does not preclude it
either. Clearly, the substantive issue here is whether it is true that contingent biological
features, in additional to the core Darwinian principles themselves, are essential to the
explanations that evolutionary theory give, and if so what those features are. However,
a proper treatment of that question is a task for another day.
7 Conclusion
The theory of evolution occupies a unique position in biology, explaining and uni-
fying a vast and diverse body of phenomena. This is hardly a new observation, as
Dobzhansky’s oft-repeated dictum “nothing in biology makes sense except in the
light of evolution” shows (Dobzhansky 1973). The aim of this article has been to
identify one interesting way in which the explanatory scope of evolutionary theory
has increased over time, namely by the endogenization of features that were originally
presuppositions of other evolutionary explanations. This concept of endogenization
provides a useful perspective on the recent history of evolutionary biology, helping
to reveal commonalities between diverse scientific developments. And the concept is
directly relevant to two important issues in the philosophy of evolutionary biology: the
question about how best to formulate the core Darwinian principles, and the question
of reduction to first principles.
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